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Vaughan: Closing the Window of Opportunity: The Limited Rights of Putative

NOTE

Closing the Window of Opportunity: The Limited Rights of Putative Fathers Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 and In re Byrd
I.

INTRODUCTION

In September 1997, eighteen-year-old Shelly O'Donnell informed
seventeen-year-old Michael Gilmartin that she was pregnant, and that
based on her estimated due date, she believed that he was the father of
her unborn child.' During the next two months, Shelly went to see
Michael often, discussed her pregnancy with him, and showed him
ultrasound images of her baby.2
During that time, Michael and his mother offered Shelly the
opportunity to alleviate some of her expenses by allowing her to live
rent-free in Michael's mother's home during her pregnancy.3 Shelly,
however, declined the offer. 4 Soon after that, in November 1997,
Michael left moved away and began working two full-time jobs in order
to save money for the baby.5
Later that month, Shelly contacted Michael and told him that she
had received a revised estimated delivery date for the baby that indicated that he might not be the father of her child.6 Not long after
learning this information, Shelly decided to give up her child for adoption and began working through an adoption network. Through this
network, she became acquainted with the Byrd family and made the
decision to place the child with them.7 She contacted Michael and
asked him to consent to the adoption, but he refused, telling her that
he "wanted his baby."8
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

In re Adoption of Byrd, 137 N.C.App. 623, 624, 529 S.E.2d 465, 467 (2000).
Id. at 635, 529 S.E.2d at 473.
Id. at 628, 529 S.E.2d at 469.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 624, 634, 529 S.E.2d at 467, 472 (Hunter, J. dissenting).
Id. at 624, 529 S.E.2d at 467.
Id.
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Shelly subsequently petitioned the Chowan County District Court
to make a "Prebirth Determination of Right" as to whether Michael's
consent to the adoption of her child was required. 9 After receiving
notice of this action, Michael filed a response that read:
5. [T]he respondent contends that his consent to adopt is required and
believes that he possibly is the biological father of the child. That the
petitioner repeatedly told the respondent that he was the biological
father of the said child. That the respondent is desirous of having custody of the said child placed with him if it is determined that he is the

biologicalfather....
8. That the [respondent] is desirous of assisting with the medical
expenses incurred regarding the birth of the child, as well as being
interested in paying child support for the care and maintenance of the
child, should he be determined to be the child's father.'
Before the matter was heard by the district court, Shelly gave birth
to a baby girl, Rachel, on March 4, 1998.1 That same day, Michael
went to the hospital in an attempt to see the baby, but the hospital staff
told him that he was not on Shelly's list of approved visitors.' 2 Michael
purchased a money order for $100.00 and some baby clothes on the
day of Rachel's birth and gave them to his mother so that she could
mail them to Shelly. Shelly, however, did not receive them until March
9, 1998, after the Byrds had filed their adoption petition. 13 The next
day Michael returned to the hospital, but was again forbidden to see
14
Shelly or the baby.
That same day, March 5, 1998, the Byrds, without Michael's
knowledge, filed a petition to adopt Rachel in the Wake County District Court. 5 On that same day, Michael filed a complaint and petition in Chowan County District Court requesting a court-ordered
blood test of the child to determine paternity, a stay of all other proceedings in the cause until paternity was determined, and custody or
visitation rights if he was determined to be the father of the child. 16 The
district court in Chowan County denied Michael's request. i7
After being served with a copy of the Byrds' adoption petition,
Michael filed a response, again requesting custody or visitation with
9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. (quoting response filed by Michael Gilmartin)(emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 636-37, 529 S.E.2d at 473 (Hunter, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625, 529 S.E.2d at 467.
Id.
Id.
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the child if he was determined to be the biologicalfather of the child. 18 In
July 1998, Michael moved for a blood test pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 8-50.1(bl) in district court in Wake County, which was granted. 19
The results of the test indicated that, to a 99.99% certainty, Michael
was the father of Shelly O'Donnell's child.2 °
Despite these test results and all of Michael's efforts to become
involved to prevent his child's adoption, the trial court in Wake
County concluded in an adoption hearing in October 1998 that
Michael's consent to the adoption was not required under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 48-3-601.21 The court based its decision on its conclusion that
before the filing of the adoption petition by the Byrds, Michael had
failed to acknowledge the child and to provide support for the mother
and child as required by the statute.2 2 Michael appealed from that
order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.2 3
The court of appeals affirmed the order of the district court as a
proper-yet harsh-application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601. In addition, the court of appeals did, in fact, acknowledge that Michael faced
a "difficult dilemma '24 during the pregnancy and subsequent birth of
his child. 25 In the majority opinion, which adhered to a strict and literal construction of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601, the court of appeals
seemed to call on the legislature to remedy the statute because of its
potential to produce such an unfair and illogical result. 26 This note

will discuss whether the court's interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 483-601 is consistent with legislative intent and with North Carolina case
18. Id.
19. Id. at 626, 529 S.E.2d at 467. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-50.1(bl) provides:
In the trial of any civil action in which the question of parentage arises, the
court shall, on motion of a party, order the mother, the child, and the alleged
father-defendant to submit to one or more blood or genetic marker tests, to be
performed by a duly certified physician or other expert .... The results of
the blood or genetic marker tests shall have the following effect: ...
(4) If the experts conclude that the genetic tests show that the alleged parent
is not excluded and that the probability of the alleged parent's parentage is
ninety-seven percent (97%) or higher, the alleged parent is presumed to be
the parent and this evidence shall be admitted. This presumption may be
rebutted only by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-50.1(bl) (1999).
20. In re Adoption of Byrd, 137 N.C.App. 623, 626, 529 S.E.2d 465, 467 (2000).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 626, 529 S.E.2d at 467-68.
23. Id. at 626, 529 S.E.2d at 468.
24. Id. at 628, 529 S.E.2d at 468-69.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 628, 529 S.E.2d at 469.
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law, and will then address whether this statute adequately protects the
constitutional rights of unmarried putative fathers as mandated by the
United States Supreme Court.
II.

NORTH CAROLINA STATUTES AND THE RIGHTS OF
UNMARRIED FATHERS

The rights of an unmarried putative father to consent (or withhold his consent) to the adoption of his child are governed by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601, which sets out those persons whose consent to
an adoption is required.2 7 The statute reads, in pertinent part:
[A] petition to adopt a minor may be granted only if consent to the
adoption has been executed by: ...
b. Any man who may or may not be the biological father of the minor

but who:...
4. Before the earlier of the filing of the petition or the date of a hearing
under G.S. 48-2-206, has acknowledged his paternity of the minor and
I. Is obligated to support the minor under written agreement or by
court order;
II. Has provided, in accordance with his financial means, reasonable

and consistent payments for the support of the biological mother during or after the term of pregnancy, or the support of the minor, or both,
which may include the payment of medical expenses, living expenses,
or other tangible means of support, and has regularly visited or communicated, or attempted to visit or communicate with the biological
mother during or after the term of pregnancy, or with the minor, or
with both; or
III. After the minor's birth but before the minor's placement for adoption or the mother's relinquishment, has married or attempted to
marry the mother of the minor by a marriage solemnized in apparent
27. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 and 7B-1111 also address a putative father's rights
in adoption. N.C. Gen. § Stat. 48-3-603 provides that consent to adoption is not
required of an individual whose parental rights have been terminated under Chapter
7B. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5) establishes that the parental rights of the father of
a juvenile born out of wedlock may be terminated if the father, prior to the filing of a
petition to terminate parental rights, has failed to:
a. Established paternity judicially or by affidavit which has been filed in a
central registry maintained by the Department of Health and Human
Services ... ; or

b. Legitimated the juvenile pbirsuant to provisions of G.S. 49-10 or filed a
petition for this specific purpose; or
c. Legitimated the juvenile by marriage to the mother of the juvenile; or
d. Provided substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to
the juvenile or the mother.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (1999).
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compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be
declared invalid ....28

Thus, an adoption can proceed without the consent of the child's
unmarried biological father if the court finds, during or prior to the
adoption proceeding, that the father has failed to acknowledge the
child and provide adequate support as required by N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 48-3-601(2)(b). 2 9
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 is part of the new Chapter 48, governing adoptions, which was passed by the North Carolina legislature
in 1995 and became effective July 1, 1996.30 First among the statutory
changes is a modification of the stated legislative intent for the entire
chapter. 3 1 The first section of the chapter clearly establishes several
"primary purpose[s] ' 32 of the chapter. The first such purpose is "to
advance the welfare of minors by (i) protecting minors from unnecessary separation from their original parents. '3 3 This is a clear break
from the former statute, which listed first among its primary purposes
the protection of "children from unnecessary separation from parents
[adoptive or biological] who might give them good homes and loving
care." 3 4 The former statute goes on to stress the importance of protecting children "from interference, long after they have become properly
adjusted in their adoptive homes by biological parents who may have
some legal claim." 35 The new statute indicates no such concern for
28. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b) (1999).
29. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b) (1999).
30. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-100 editor's note (1999).
31. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-100 (1999).
32. Id.
33. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-100(b)(1) (1999)(emphasis added). Other "primary
purposes" listed are:
(ii) facilitating the adoption of minors in need of adoptive placement by
persons who can give them love, care, security, and support, (iii) protecting
minors from placement with adoptive parents unfit to have responsibility for
their care and rearing, and (iv) assuring the finality of the adoption.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-100(b)(1) (1995).
Secondary purposes listed are:
(i) to protect biological parents from ill-advised decisions to relinquish a
child or consent to the child's adoption, (ii) to protect adoptive parents from
assuming responsibility for a child about whose heredity or mental or
physical condition they know nothing, (iii) to protect the privacy of the
parties to the adoption, and (iv) to discourage unlawful trafficking in minors

and other unlawful placement activities.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-100(b)(2) (1999).
34. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1 (repealed 1996).

35. Id.
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protecting children against disruption of their adoptive families, and
instead indicates increased concern for protection of the biological parent-child relationship. 3 6 The current N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-100 goes
on to direct that provisions of the chapter "shall be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.

'3 7

It

would then seem that, within the current statutory framework, any
questions regarding the meaning and application of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 48-3-601 sholld be resolved in favor of the relationship between the
child and his or her biological parent, absent any evidence that preservation of that relationship would be contrary to the child's welfare. 38
The Byrd case represents the first time that the North Carolina
Court of Appeals has addressed a putative father's rights under the
new adoptions chapter. Under prior statutes, a putative father who
had not judicially established paternity or legitimated his child could
protect his right to consent to an adoption simply by "provid[ing] substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to the child
and mother. '39 The current statute establishes a two-prong test under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 for determining whether the consent of a
putative father who has not otherwise legitimated the child is necessary.4 ° To satisfy the first prong, the father must "acknowledge" the
child. 4 1 The second prong requires that he also meet at least one of
three requirements: (1) be under a written agreement or court order to
support the child, (2) provide support for the child as defined in the
statute, or (3) marry or attempt to marry the mother of the child after
the child's birth. 42 It is within the framework of this two-prong test
that the court of appeals analyzed the facts in the Byrd case. 43
36. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-100 (1999).
37. Id.
38. See In re Adoption of Clark, 327 N.C. 61, 73, 393 S.E.2d 791, 798 (1990)
(Whichard, J., dissenting) (arguing that previous adoption statutes were to be liberally
construed in favor of the legislative mandate set forth in the former N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 48-1). The former statute listed among its "primary purposes" the protection of
children from "unnecessary separation from parents who might give them good homes
and loving care" and protection from "interference ... in their adoptive homes by
biological parents who may have some legal claim", but made no mention of original
parents. Id. The current statute and its stated intent represent a significant departure
from the previous emphasis on adoptive parents. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-100(b) (1999).
39. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-6(3) (repealed 1996).
40. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 (1999).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. In re Adoption of Byrd, 137 N.C.App. 623, 529 S.E.2d 465 (2000).
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IIl.

THE BYRD CASE

North Carolina courts have historically recognized that because
adoption laws are in derogation of the common law, they must be
strictly construed, so that judicial interpretation does not enlarge or
confer any rights that are not clearly set forth by the statute under
consideration. 4 4 Despite the current statute's clear protection for original parents under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-100 and its direction for liberal construction in keeping with that purpose, the court of appeals in
the Byrd case set out to determine the legislative intent behind N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 by giving "plain meaning" to the language in the
45
statute.
The first task facing the Byrd court was to determine the meaning
of the word "acknowledge" as used in the statute, and to determine
whether Michael Gilmartin's actions were consistent with that meaning.4 6 Citing Carpenter v. Hawley,4 7 a 1981 worker's compensation
case, the court recognized that "acknowledgement" has been held to
refer not only to some formal act, but may also include the "'life, acts,
and conduct of the parties, or any other satisfactory evidence that the
relation was recognized and admitted."' In the Carpentercase, a putative father had lived with the mother of his child both before and after
the child's birth, told other acquaintances that the child was his, told
the child that he was her father, and provided ongoing support for the
child.4 8 The court found that these actions were sufficient to constitute "acknowledgement" for the purposes of paternity.4 9
In the Byrd case, the court of appeals considered whether Michael
Gilmartin's life, acts, and conduct evidenced his recognition of paternity.5 o They agreed with the trial court that Gilmartin's actions, specifically offering the mother a place to live during the pregnancy, working
to save money for the child, and filing various court documents indicating his interest in custody or visitation, were not enough to constitute "acknowledgement," and thereby failed to satisfy the first prong of
the statutory test of his right to consent. 5 ' According to the court,
although Gilmartin's actions did indicate his interest in the child,
44. See Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N.C. 778, 780, 178 S.E. 573, 574 (1935).
45. Byrd at 627, 529 S.E.2d at 468.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Carpenter v. Hawley, 53 N.C. App. 715, 720, 281 S.E.2d 783, 786
(1981)).
48. Carpenter, 53 N.C. App. at 720, 281 S.E.2d at 786.
49. Id.
50. Byrd at 627-28, 529 S.E.2d at 468.
51. Id.
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because that interest was clearly conditioned on a determination that
he was the child's biological father, his actions fell short of indicating
that "the [paternity] relation was recognized and admitted.

' 52

The

result highlights the unfair, illogical, and unreasonable dilemma he
could unconditionally acknowledge as his own a child who might not
be his, or forever lose the opportunity to have a voice in decisions
about a child that could conceivably be his child.
Justice Hunter, in his dissenting opinion, argued that because the
statute contains the language "[a]ny man who may or may not be the
biological father", 3 it required Michael Gilmartin to acknowledge, not
that he was actually the child's father, but that he "may or may not be
the father. 54 Although such a reading of the statute probably produces a more logical end result, it illogically rearranges the language of
the statute and alters its plain meaning. The majority correctly concluded that a plain reading of the statute requires more.
Although Michael Gilmartin's right to consent to the adoption was
lost if he failed to satisfy the requirement of acknowledgment, the
court of appeals also addressed the question of whether he satisfied
the second requirement under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(b), that he
provide support for the child.55 The statute's qualification that the
56
putative father's support be "in accordance with his financial means
is consistent with former adoption statutes and case law that conditioned a putative father's obligation to pay support on a finding that he
was "physically and financially able to do so."57
Gilmartin offered evidence as to the limitations on his ability to
provide support, but contended that he had nevertheless satisfied the
support requirement by working two jobs to save money for his
child. 58 However, the trial court's findings of fact clearly indicate that,
other than an offer of a place for her to stay, Gilmartin never provided
any financial support to Shelly O'Donnell or to her child prior to the
filing of the adoption petition.59 None of Gilmartin's saved income
ever reached O'Donnell or her baby, except perhaps for the $100.00
money order that never actually reached her until after the petition to
52. Id. (quoting Carpenter, 53 N.C. App. at 720, 281 S.E.2d at 786).
53. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 (1999).
54. Byrd at 636, 529 S.E.2d at 473 (J. Hunter dissenting).
55. Id. at 629-32, 529 S.E.2d at 469-71.
56. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b4) (1999).
57. See In re Adoption of Maynor, 38 N.C. App. 724, 726, 248 S.E.2d 875, 876
(1978).
58. Byrd at 630, 529 S.E.2d at 470.
59. Id. at 629-30, 529 S.E.2d at 469-70.
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adopt had been filed.6 ° This clearly falls short of the "reasonable and
consistent payments" that are required under the statute. 6 1 While Gilmartin failed to meet the strict statutory requirements, what should a
father in his position reasonably be expected to do? In a period of
only a few short months, Gilmartin was first told that he was the father
of his girlfriend's child, and then that he was not the father. He
attempted, at first unsuccessfully, to obtain a paternity test, and he
made efforts to save money for the baby and extend help to the mother,
which was refused.
Gilmartin further contended that he was not required to comply
with the statutory support requirement, because of O'Donnell's refusals to accept support and because of the early. filing of the adoption
petition. 6' However, the court concluded that, under its plain meaning, the statute does not condition the father's support requirement on
the mother's willingness to accept, and clearly requires that the father
provide such support prior to the filing of the adoption petition,
regardless of when it is filed.6 3
Further, the statute provides an avenue for a putative father to
meet this requirement even when the adoption petition is filed shortly
after birth, by specifying that the support may be rendered "during or
after the term of pregnancy".6 4 Indeed, at least five months passed
between the time that Gilmartin learned of the pregnancy and the filing of the adoption petition, and still he provided no support during
this critical time. 65 It is clear that the statute's support requirement, in
effect, places putative fathers in Michael Gilmartin's situation in an
unreasonable position: to either provide substantial financial support
for a child who might not even be his, or lose forever his right to be
involved in his child's life.
It is clear that, within the plain meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3601, Michael Gilmartin failed to meet the requirements necessary to
preserve his right to consent to his child's adoption. However, this
66
result is one that the court recognized as unfair and anomalous.
This case does not involve a putative father who was absent or unconcerned before and after the birth of his child, but rather one who
repeatedly objected to any adoption and took deliberate steps to pre60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b4)(1I) (1999).
Byrd at 631, 529 S.E.2d at 470.
Id. at 631-32, 529 S.E.2d at 471.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b4) (1999).
Byrd at 624-25, 529 S.E.2d at 467.
Id. at 628, 529 S.E.2d at 469.
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serve his right to prevent such an adoption.6 7 Gilmartin contended
that it was reasonable for him to condition his acknowledgment of the
child on a determination that he was actually her father, 68 and common sense would agree. However, the plain language of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 48-3-601 contradicts such a common-sense approach and contradicts the first stated "primary purpose" of the statute, which is to
"protect[ I minors from unnecessary separation from their original
parents. '6 9 The court recognized this conflict and called on the legislature to "reflect on its words to determine if in fact they intended such a
result."

70

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Constitutional arguments were not raised in the Byrd case and
were therefore not considered by the court. 7 1 However, an examination
of the constitutional protections afforded to putative fathers like
Michael Gilmartin by the United States Supreme Court, North Carolina courts, and courts in other states provides another compelling reason for the legislature to "further reflect on its words to determine if in
72
fact they intended such a result."

A.

United States Supreme Court Cases

The United States Supreme Court first recognized constitutional
protection of an unmarried father's parental rights in Stanley v. Illinois, 73 holding that a statutory presumption that all unmarried fathers

are unfit and not entitled to consideration in custody decisions regarding their children violated the rights of the fathers under the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment."
However, in Quilloin v. Walcott,75 a case specifically involving a
father's rights in an adoption proceeding, the Supreme Court made it
clear that all unmarried fathers do not automatically share such constitutional protection. In that case, the Court found that an unwed
67. Id. at 625-26, 529 S.E.2d at 467.
68. Id. at 628, 529 S.E.2d at 468.
69. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b4) (1999).
70. Byrd at 628, 529 S.E.2d at 469.
71. See In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273, 277, 346 S.E.2d 511, 515
(1986) (holding that North Carolina appellate courts will not consider constitutional
arguments that were not raised and ruled upon at the trial level).
72. Byrd at 628, 529 S.E.2d at 469.
73. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
74. Id. at 649.
75. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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father who had not petitioned for legitimation of his child, nor sought
or obtained custody of the child in the eleven years of her life prior to
the adoption petition, did not have a right to consent to her adoption.76
The key in the Quilloin decision was that the father had "never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child. ''77 Thus, Quilloin established that the constitutional protection afforded to a putative father's parental rights is not automatic. 78 When a putative father
fails to show a substantial interest in his child, or to employ those
methods set forth by state law to solidify those rights, he forfeits full
constitutional protection.79
The Supreme Court next considered the putative father's rights
relating to the adoption of his child in Caban v. Mohammed.8 ° The
Court found that where a father has established a substantial relationship with his child and has admitted paternity, his parental rights
should be afforded the same protection as those of the mother, and
that he therefore was entitled to consent to, or withhold consent to, any
adoption of his child.81 This case, like Quilloin, involved the adoption
of older children, where the putative father had the opportunity for a
number of years to solidify his parental rights, but had failed to do
so. 8 2 However, the Court noted the special problems that are involved
in identifying and locating fathers of illegitimate children when an
adoption is initiated during infancy.83 Although the Court seemed to
leave room for the possibility that legislative distinctions between the
rights afforded to mothers and fathers of illegitimate children adopted
as infants might be constitutional, it did not specifically address that
issue.84
In Lehr v. Robertson,85 the Court more clearly articulated the relationship between a putative father's "biological status" as father and
the actions necessary to afford him constitutional protection. The case
involved a putative father's petition to open, vacate, and/or set aside an
order of adoption due to a failure of the state to give him notice of the
76. Id. at 254.
77. Id. at 256.
78. See Kelly Anne Davis, Note, Minimizing the Putative Father's Rights, 68 N.C. L.
Rev. 1257, 1260 (1990).
79. Id. at 1260.
80. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
81. Id. at 393.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 380; Quilloin at 249.
Caban at 392.
Id.
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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pending adoption.8 6 Upholding the adoption, the Court stated that a
putative father's mere biological link to his illegitimate child does not
merit constitutional protection. 7 Instead,
[t]he significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a
relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely
valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so,
the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen
to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.8 8
Thus, in considering the putative father's right to consent to his
child's adoption, the Court in Lehr was "concerned only with whether
New York ha[d] adequately protected his opportunity to form such a
relationship." 9 The applicable New York statute provided seven categories of action which would entitle a putative father to notice of an
adoption. 9° Because the putative father had not taken advantage of any
of those avenues of action in the two years between his child's birth
and the initiation of adoption proceedings, the Court found that failure to provide him with notice of the adoption did not violate his
rights under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. 9 ' In short, the
state law afforded him ample opportunity to develop a relationship,
92
and he failed to avail himself of that opportunity.
This is where the Supreme Court's analysis of a putative father's
rights in adoption cases stands to date. The relevant question therefore becomes, as in the Lehr case, whether North Carolina's adoption
statutes adequately protect the "opportunity" constitutionally guaranteed to all putative fathers to develop a relationship with their children.
As applied in the Byrd case, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 seemingly fails
to provide Gilmartin with such adequate opportunity. Thus, the facts
in the Byrd case give rise to a potential argument that the statute is
unconstitutional as applied. This is all the more reason for the legislature to reconsider the structure of the statute.
86. Id. at 248.
87. Id. at 261.
88. Id. at 262.
89. Id.
90. Under § 111-a of the New York Domestic Relations Law, a putative father could
guarantee that he would receive notice of any adoptions proceedings involving his
child by mailing a postcard to the state's putative father registry. Id.
91. Id. at 263-264.
92. Id.
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Cases from North Carolina and Other States

North Carolina courts have also recognized the relationship that
exists between the constitutional protection of one's parental rights
and the responsibility that one has assumed for one's child.9 3 In Price
v. Howard,9 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that
natural parents enjoy a constitutionally protected interest in the companionship, custody and control of their children. However, the court
also stated that a parent can forfeit that protection through his own
actions. 9 5 Such constitutional protection of parental rights is dependent on the assumption that a natural parent will assume responsibility for his or her child and act in the child's best interest. 96 When a
parent's conduct is inconsistent with those presumptions, he or she
will not be afforded protected status.9 7 The court recognized unfitness, neglect, and abandonment as clear examples of the type of parental conduct that would override constitutional protection. 9s Other
types of conduct might be less clear and should be considered on a
case-by-case basis, in light of whether the parent's actions are consistent with parental responsibility. 9 9 For example, in Price, a mother's
protected status depended on whether her previous surrender of custody of her children to a third party was clearly temporary, as well as
whether the mother continued to be involved in her children's lives as
a parent.1 0 0
North Carolina courts have also specifically addressed the constitutional rights of unwed fathers to intervene in the adoption of their
children, and have substantially limited those rights. 101 In In re
Dixon,1 °2 the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered the dismissal due to lack of personal jurisdiction of a petition to terminate the
parental rights of an unwed father. In that case, the mother of the
child had made efforts to locate the father of her child in order to
inform him of her pregnancy, but had been unsuccessful in this
93. See In re Dockery, 128 N.C. App. 631, 495 S.E.2d 417 (1998); Price v. Howard,
346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997); In re Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 435 S.E.2d 352

(1993).
94. Price, 346 N.C. at 74, 484 S.E.2d at 532.
95. Id. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 82, 484 S.E.2d at 536.
100. Id.
101. See In re Dockery, 128 N.C. App. 631, 495 S.E.2d 417 (1998); In re Dixon, 112
N.C. App. 248, 435 S.E.2d 352 (1993).
102. 102. In re Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 249, 435 S.E.2d 352, 352 (1993).
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endeavor.103 Thus, the father of the child was unaware of the mother's
pregnancy and the birth of the child at the time that a petition to terminate his parental rights was filed. 104 Relying on Lehr, the court stated
that "the father of a child born out of wedlock does not have an absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before his child can
be adopted."10 The court stated that the North Carolina Legislature
had provided, within the termination of parental rights statutes, 10 6 a
specific method for a putative father to demonstrate his commitment
to his child. 10 7 The court further found that the two and one half
months which had passed between the child's birth and the filing of
the petition to terminate his parental rights constituted an ample
"opportunity" for the putative father to discover the birth of his child
and demonstrate a commitment to the child.' 08 The court specifically
declined to decide whether a petition filed earlier than two and a half
months after the child's birth would provide the putative father with
sufficient "opportunity", as defined by Lehr, to demonstrate his commitment to his child, and to therefore preserve constitutional protection of his parental rights. 10 9 Therefore, under Dixon, the
"opportunity", guaranteed to putative fathers by the United States
Supreme Court in Lehr, to establish a relationship with one's child and
gain protection of one's parental rights, is not available indefinitely." 0
That opportunity and a father's constitutional protection in this regard
will be extinguished if one fails to act as quickly as within the first two
and a half months of one's child's life."'
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 251, 435 S.E.2d at 353.
106. The applicable statute at the time required a putative father to:
a. Established paternity judicially or by affidavit which has been filed in a
central registry maintained by the Department of Health and Human
Resources;

...

b. Legitimate[ ] the child pursuant to provisions of G.S. 49-10, or filed a
petition for this specific purpose; or
c. Legitimated the child by marriage to the mother of the child; or
d. Provided substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to
the child and mother.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.32(6) (Supp. 1992). The current statute, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1111(5) (1999) includes identical requirements.
107. Dixon, 112 N.C. App. at 251, 435 S.E.2d at 353.
108. Id. at 251, 435 S.E.2d at 354.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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In In re Dockery, the North Carolina Court of Appeals shortened a
putative father's opportunity to establish his parental rights even further. 1 12 This case also involved a putative father who was completely
unaware of the pregnancy and birth of his child. 11 3 He first learned of
his child's existence when an attorney for the adoptive parents with
whom the mother had placed the child contacted him to request his
consent to the adoption. 1 4 Soon after learning of the child's existence, the father filed an action to establish paternity and request custody, but not before the adoptive parents filed their petition to
adopt. 1 5 The court held that because he had not stepped up to
demonstrate his commitment to the child in the five weeks of the
child's life before the filing of an adoption petition, the putative father
enjoyed a biological link, but no protected parental rights, to the
child. 11 6 Therefore, the court held that the former N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 48-6(a)(3), which made a father's consent unnecessary," i7 was not a
violation of the father's rights under either the Due Process Clause or
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 8
The application of the plain meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601
to Michael Gilmartin's rights in the Byrd case limits the brief window
of "opportunity" enjoyed by a putative father even further. In that
case, only a day passed between baby Rachel's birth and the filing of
the Byrds' adoption petition." 9 The case thus raises the question of
whether a statute which extinguishes a putative father's rights to consent to adoption only one day after birth and before a "biological link"
112. 128 N.C. App. 631, 495 S.E.2d 417 (1998).
113. Id. at 632, 495 S.E.2d at 418.

114. Id.
115. Id. at 632-33, 495 S.E.2d at 418.
116. Id. at 636, 495 S.E.2d at 421.
117. The former N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-6(a)(3) provided that:
In the case of a child born out of wedlock the consent of the putative father
shall not be required unless prior to the filing of the adoption petition:
a. Paternity has been judicially established or acknowledged by affidavit
which has been filed in a central registry maintained by the Department of
Human Resources...
b. The child has been legitimated either by marriage to the mother or in
accordance with provisions of G.S. 49-10, a petition for legitimation has been
filed; or
c. The putative father has provided substantial financial support or
consistent care with respect to the child and mother.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-6(a)(3) (repealed 1996).
118. Dockery, 128 N.C. App. at 636, 495 S.E.2d at 421.
119. Byrd at 625, 529 S.E.2d at 467.
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can even be confirmed provides the level of constitutional protection
contemplated by the Supreme Court in the Lehr case.
The Byrd case involved two obstacles to a putative father's parental relationship that the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed. First, it involved an adoption petition filed so quickly
that, in order to act prior to the petition, the putative father would have
been required to demonstrate his commitment to the child through
efforts prior to the child's birth. Second, it involved such uncertainty
about paternity that the putative father was required to assume responsibility for a child with whom he may or may not have shared a biologi20
cal link.1

These issues have been addressed to some extent in other
states.'2 1 Some states have held that a father's opportunity and duty
to demonstrate a commitment to his child begins during the prebirth
period.' 22 In Adoption of Michael H., the California Supreme Court
held that, in order to preserve a right to withhold consent to adoption,
a father must take sufficient and timely steps to transform his constitutional parental interest into a fundamental right. 1 23 According to the
court, those steps included a requirement that the father demonstrate
a "full commitment to parenthood during pregnancy'"124 and "within a

short time"' 25 after the father discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the mother is pregnant with his child.126 Similarly, an
Oklahoma court found in In re Adoption of Baby Girl M. that "the

parental opportunity interest begins at conception, but it is not indestructible and may be lost by the biological father's failure to pursue
and develop that relationship.' 1

27

To do so, the court stated the father

must undertake acts demonstrating not only future intent but also the
present assumption of parental duties. 128 Holdings like these, however,
do not address the particularly difficult circumstances that exist when
paternity remains uncertain until after the child's birth.
120. Id.
121. See Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Rights of Unwed Fatherto Obstruct Adoption
of His Child by Withholding Consent, 61 A.L.R.5th 151 (1998).
122. In re Adoption of Baby Girl M., 942 P.2d 235 (Okla. 1997); see Adoption of
Michael H., 898 P.2d 891 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 1176 (1996).
123. Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 896 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S.

1176 (1996).
124. Id. at 897 (emphasis added).

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Baby Girl M. at 243 (emphasis added).

128. Id.
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A more relevant holding may be found in the case that has become
known as the "Baby Jessica" case, 129 whose facts are strikingly similar
to the circumstances involved in the Byrd case. In that case, now fixed
in our memories by the disturbing images of a terrified two-year-old
being taken from her adoptive parents, the biological mother originally
named another man as the father of her child, and did not inform the
natural father until three weeks after the child's birth that the child
was his. 130 Soon thereafter, he filed a petition to intervene in the
child's adoption.

13 1

The Iowa court found that "Jessica's" natural father did not forfeit
his parental rights by failing to act immediately when he became aware
of the mother's pregnancy, noting that it would be "totally unrealistic
• . . [to] require a potential father to become involved in the pregnancy
on the mere speculation that he might be the father."'1 32 According to
the court, such a requirement would deprive a father of the "meaningful right, protected by the Constitution, to develop a parent-child
relationship.' 3 3
Application of the plain meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 to
Michael Gilmartin's dilemma in the Byrd case imposes just such a
"totally unrealistic" requirement. 1 34 Under the statute, Gilmartin
would have had to become involved in Shelly O'Donnell's pregnancy
and even provide her with financial support on the mere chance that
he might be her child's father, and in spite of her statements to the
contrary. By not affording him any opportunity after the child's birth
to confirm a biological link to his child and then to demonstrate his
commitment, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 deprived Gilmartin of his constitutionally protected opportunity to develop a parent-child
relationship.
V.

CONCLUSION

In In re Byrd, the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed for
the first time the effects of the new N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 on the
rights of an unmarried putative father to develop a relationship with
his child or, more specifically, to exercise a voice in decisions about
the child's possible adoption. The court used standard principles of
statutory construction to determine the statute's plain meaning and to
129. . In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
130. Id. at 241.
131. Id.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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apply it to the circumstances of the case. However, in so doing, the
court reached a decision that even it acknowledged to be both unfair
and illogical, a decision which "cr[ies] out for fairness, or a different
35
result."1
The court declined to overstep its "restrained role" and reach a
1 36
different decision which would have, in effect, made new law.
Instead, it called on the North Carolina legislature to reconsider the
statute and the problems it creates. The legislature should re-evaluate
the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 in light of situations like
that of Michael Gilmartin, because: 1) application of the statute under
circumstances like these creates a result which contradicts the stated
purpose of the adoption statutes, "protecting minors from unnecessary
separation from their original parents"; 1 3 7 and 2) the statute, as
applied under these circumstances, fails to provide an unmarried
father with his constitutionally protected right to an opportunity to
develop a relationship with his child.
If the legislature's purpose is truly to protect unnecessary severance of the biological parent-child relationship, it must refine N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 to specifically address those situations where
paternity remains questionable until after the child's birth. In such
situations, it is illogical, unfair, and manifestly unreasonable to require
a putative father to acknowledge paternity and provide substantial
financial support for a child who may not be his. It remains important, even in these situations, to require such a father to demonstrate
an early and clear commitment to the child in order to facilitate the
child's placement with a permanent family as quickly as possible. The
legislature should specify reasonable steps that a putative father like
Michael Gilmartin could take during the mother's pregnancy and very
early in the child's life to demonstrate a commitment to the child, if the
child is determined to be his. Those steps may include some of those
taken by Gilmartin in the Byrd case, such as requesting paternity testing or filing requests for custody contingent on a determination of
paternity. 1 38 By providing such specific and reasonable avenues for a
putative father to act early to preserve his possible parental relationship, the revised statute would not only result in more logical and fair

135. Byrd at 628, 529 S.E.2d at 469.

136. Id.
137. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-100 (1999).
138. Byrd at 625-26, 529 S.E.2d at 467.
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outcomes, but would also provide the constitutionally 39protected opportunity guaranteed to unmarried fathers under Lehr. 1
Lauren Vaughan

139. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
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